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Article 8

The Unity of Man
Daniel A. Dansak, M.D .
Dr. Dansak is affiliated with
the Psychiatry Service at the Veterans Administration Hospital in
Washington, D.C.

In recent years there has been
a growing trend in medicine to
re-unify the human organism into
the biological whole it was before
the advent of the medical sciences. Our efforts to understand
disease and the human body led
to ever finer divisions of the human organism. Concomitantly, as
our knowledge of these divisions
and subdivisions expanded and
deepened, the field of medicine
also divided and subdivided into
parallel specialties and subspecialties, each circumscribing portions
of the scientific advancement.
Where once a physician studied
and treated diseases in many systems, we now have specialists devoting themselves entirely to the
eye, liver, heart and bones. Moreover, these same specialists often
further subdivide their interests
according to the age of the patient. Thus, we have pediatricians,
geria tricians, pedia tric neurologists and adolescent medical specialists.
Psychiatry, too, has subdivided
the human organism by virture of
its own model of human functioning and malfunctioning. Specifically, we speak of ego, id, and
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superego as if they were separate
facets of the human being functioning at times independently
and at other times interdependently. We have gone further,
dividing the ego into various subfunctions, perceptual, cognitive
and so forth. Also, we have become child, adolescent, geriatric
and, lately, consultation-liaison
psychiatrists. Additionally, we
have specialized according to theoretical models of human behavior,
each of which, in reality, may describe only part of the totality
and unity of human behavior in
space and time.
All this is a preface to the fact
that by dissecting the human organism initially into body and
mind, and then into smaller and
smaller systems, we have, without
question, advanced our knowledge of the parts of the human
organism. Yet, at the same time,
we may well have excluded an ap- ~
preciation of his holistic, unified
functioning, or, at the least, failed
to integrate the separate areas of
knowledge so acquired. This is
not meant to deprecate the fragmentation and specialization of
medicine. Rather, I think that it
was and is an essential process in
the evolution of scientific knowledge and that now we are beginning to move into the next stage
in the evolutionary process, the
integration of the specialized
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knowledge into a fuller and more
comprehensive understanding and
approach toward Man and our
patients.
To recapitulate, in the course
of the progressive and systematic
dissection of the human organism,
we seem to have also dehumanized Man. Psychiatry, too, has
taken its initial model and, by its
own detached and deeper analyses, may well have dehumanized
Man's psyche into a variety of
systems a nd mechanisms. In other words, psychiatry may well be
obscuring the essence of humanity and t he unity of Man via its
mechanically-based "dynamics"
and other conceptions of human
behavior. The c ur r e n t trend
among some psychiatrists to emphasize patients' rights a nd to
challenge traditional diagnostic
categories appears in some respects to be a reaction to this
process of psychiatric dehumanization . Furthermore, by focusing
on psychic, or mental , functions,
without sufficient considerations
of Man's biology, psychiatrists
seem to have indirectly encouraged and sustained, along with
our medical colleagues, an artificial dichotomy, that of mind and
body.
Today, this postulated dichotomy is being questioned by many
physicians, psychiatrists and others, partly because it has been
used too often as an excuse or
shield for specialists on one side
to avoid dealing with problems
on the other. Psychiatrists say it
is a medical problem and the
medical people say it is a psy110

chiatric problem, when, in fact, it
is a problem worthy of study by
both sides. Obviously, t his intellectual ping-pong game with th e
patient can prove destructive,
with ill-effects faIling primarily
on the patient.
At this point it should be noted
that neither t he proponents of
t he bodily or organic view, nor
the proponents of the mental or
functional view, are much inclin ed
to deal with the religious or spiritual features of human beings.
Rather, it is often said that t he
spiritual aspects are not subject
to scien t ific inquiry, or t hat it is
a mental a bstraction, a construct
of the human mind, a symbolic
human father. Both organicists
a nd functionalists thus sweep
aside an aspect of Man t hat has
received much a nt hropological attention a nd which has as strong a
history as t he former facets . M y
point is that whatever physicians
t hink and believe about their own
spiritual and religious features,
t he fact is that many of our patients believe in and practice a
variety of religions. Therefore, by
ignoring or psychodynamically
" explaining" the fa ct of religious
beliefs and practices in our patients, we fail to appreciate, as
with the mind-body duality, t he
totality of human functioning as
it exists for the patient.
It is, therefore, my contention
t hat for medicine, including psychiatry, to be truly comprehensive, it must also consider the patient's religious and spiritual
problems and needs, however we
may personally feel about these
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needs in ourselves.
Presently, it seems to me that
physicians see the chaplain's role
primarily applicable to the dying
patient, as an opiate for physical
and emotional suffering in the patient, and, perhaps, in the attending doctor. This attitude obviously ignores the fact that healthy
people pray and attend religious
services. It ignores the fact that
acutely and chronically nonterminally ill patients seek and
find comfort, strength and immeasurable support from their religious beliefs in the face of pain
and suffering. In short, it ignores
the fact that religious beliefs and
practices are an integral and important aspect to many of our
patients' lives. This is not meant
to imply that physicians should
provide religious ministrations.
Rather, it is intended that we
should appreciate the need for
such ministrations in our patients
and to advise the appropriate
priest, minister or rabbi of this
need.
The problem, then, is how to
initiate awareness and integrate
appreciation of the spiritual part
of Man into a truly comprehensive
approach to the patient, one that
will consider the patient as a human being, and not simply a
mind, a body, or a spirit.
As a beginning, the following
suggestions are offered. First,
those medical people, including
psychiatrists, who have always
considered their patient's spiritual needs, must begin to speak
openly about them to their colleagues, students, and ancillary
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personnel. Secondly, those in
medicine who have ignored them
must be willing at least to listen,
regardless of their own personal
beliefs and biases, to their patients who express such needs
spontaneously and to their colleagues who have attempted to
meet such needs directly or indirectly. (That is, the physician
attempts to listen to the patient's
concerns or seeks to have the appropriate priest, minister or rabbi
advise or fulfill the needs directly.) Likewise, chaplains who are
associated with medical facilities
and hospitals must be willing to
offer their knowledge freely, both
about the spiritual needs of the
patient as well as about other
concerns the patient may have
which could affect the physician's
decisions regarding treatment.
management and rehabilitation .
(Patients will sometimes tell their
ministers things they do not tell
their doctors, and vice versa. Such
information can often be shared,
without violating confidentiality,
to the patient's benefit.) Finally,
on all sides of the patient, the
physician, psychiatrist, and chaplain must learn a bit of each other's special language, concerns,
and problems and techniques of
dealing with patients so that communications about the patient can
be implemented and facilitated.
By communicating more freely
and working in closer proximity,
it is my impression that we can
pierce and dissipate the unnecessary ritualistic mysteries and
auras which, from the patient's
view, presently surround the phy-
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sician, psychiatrist, and chaplain
alike. By eliminating these artificial conceptual boundaries, all of
us can help lead medicine, psychiatry and religion to a holistic
and unified appreciation of life,

living, and humanity, perhaps the
greatest mysteries, and ones we
share equally with our patients.
In fact, a better appreciation of
our own unity may prove to be
the key to comprehensive medical
care.

A Note On the Unborn Person
Ralph J. Masiello
Dr. Masiello is on the facult y
of the D epartment of Philosophy
at Niagara University in New
York.

Even if it be granted that the
unborn child does not possess life,
but only potential life-the absurd thesis of Justice Blackmun,
in Roe v. Wade, January 22, 1973
-no justification for an abortion
is established either morally or
legally. Granted that this unacceptable position did actually
maintain in reality, it could only
signify that the actual life of the
born child would be derived from
the potential life of the unborn
child. A potential human being
would be virtually a human being.
It would have a vital principle to
become human. Now the closest
thing in dignity to any nature is
found in the principle of that nature. If one destroys the dignity
of the principle, how does one restore the diginity of the nature?
Among the reasons presented
for a basis of decision, the Court
maintained that "the unborn have
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never been recognized in the law
as persons in the whole sense."
But the notion of person can only
be understood as indivisible. What
the Court wished to convey is
that the rights of the unborn have
not been consistently treated in
civil and criminal suits. It would
have been incumbent upon the
Court, in arriving at so weighty a
decision, to explore whether the
unborn child could at least enjoy
the status of a moral person. But
this door they dared not open
because a moral person has the
right to perpetuate itself. Justice
Blackmun's elaborate historical,
legal, and moral maze of fact and
fancy was designed to leave no
avenue of escape in this direction.
A more tenable position is that
t he human intellectual principle
establishes the human person.
This principle is at first only in
potency to knowledge, both before birth and immediately after
birth. Now, how do we establish
t he origin of this principle in
man?
Too often, of late, the man of
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